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Abstract
This article discusses John White’s recent critique of the notion of ‘powerful 
knowledge’. It is argued that White raises some salient points but overlooks the 
genesis of powerful knowledge as an idea and its debt to Durkheim and Bernstein. 
It is suggested that the work of Michael Young and others on powerful knowledge 
can be understood as both an exercise in the sociology of educational knowledge 
and an intervention in debates about the curriculum. Explicating the relationship 
between exercise and intervention sheds further light on White’s critique and its 
subject matter.
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Introduction
This article reflects on some elements of John White’s (2018) critique of the notion 
of ‘powerful knowledge’ (PK) in this journal and offers an alternative means of 
understanding debates about PK that foreground the genesis of the idea and the 
sociological tradition from which it has emerged. It is argued that the work of Young 
and others on PK can be seen as both an exercise in the sociology of educational 
knowledge played out primarily in an academic domain and an intervention within 
curriculum debates that occur within policy and practice domains as much as in 
academia. It is suggested that PK should not lose sight of its Durkheimian and 
Bernsteinian origins or its link to Vygotskian work, and that the sociological argument 
for PK is primarily about how we understand the relationship between knowledge and 
society, and therefore takes a socio-historical approach to epistemological questions. 
Indeed, the approach taken by Young and his collaborators is part of a distinctive 
tradition, which some philosophers would agree is necessary for a fuller understanding 
of knowledge. It is argued that PK offers opportunities to see the world differently, and 
this comes about through social formation of the mind, which is only made possible 
by and through specialized communities. However, the changing nature of society, 
and the ever-iterating nature of (always fallible) knowledge, suggests that boundaries 
between disciplines and between communities must always be semi-permeable and 
up for debate – and this may have implications for the curriculum. 
Comments on John White’s arguments
White (2018: 326) criticizes PK for (inter alia) its reliance on ‘sui generis systems of 
interrelated concepts’, a misplaced assumption about the ‘gulf between subject-
based and everyday knowledge’ (ibid.: 327) and its inadequacy as a starting point 
for the school curriculum, suggesting that Young is confusing the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ 
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(ibid.: 329) by basing his argument for knowledge on ‘his empirical observation of 
schools in their social and historical setting’ (ibid.: 329). White also compares the PK 
debate with earlier debates on Hirst’s form of knowledge, arguing that ‘discussions of 
PK lack … careful exposition and close argumentation’ (ibid.: 333–4) and notes that 
‘writings on powerful knowledge are often a frontier-less amalgam of ideas from many 
fields’ (ibid.: 334). White also recaps some earlier points he has made in criticisms of PK 
and Young’s work (White, 2012), foregrounding his own arguments for an aims-based 
curriculum. 
White (2018: 325) starts his analysis by asking ‘what is powerful knowledge (PK)’?, 
suggesting that the term has a ‘strong, positive emotional charge’ that may explain 
‘why it has become attractive to many in the educational world’. He states that ‘when 
we try to see what the term means, the answer is elusive’ (ibid.) before using a quote 
from Young (2015) as a basis for his own interpretation. For White (ibid.: 326), there are 
‘two main features of PK, epistemological and social’, with the epistemological ‘to do 
with bodies of knowledge built around their own, sui generis systems of interrelated 
concepts’ and the social that ‘is the province of distinct specialised groups’. While this 
interpretation could be read from the quote used from Young, it arguably misconstrues 
the understanding of knowledge that underpins the development of Young’s work on 
PK, namely that the epistemic is inextricable from the social, and vice versa. The two 
features that White separates for his analysis are seen as mutually constitutive by Young 
and his collaborators. Their approach is ‘socio-epistemic’ (Young and Muller, 2013: 
233; Muller, 2009: 205), arguing with Durkheim (2001) that contemporary knowledge 
is a reflection of its socio-historical constitution: it is a product of the ways in which 
humans have organized themselves to develop symbolic systems to understand the 
world. It is emergent from (and reliant on) particular forms of social organization that 
enable specialized knowledge to transcend its original context of production (Young 
and Muller, 2013). Characteristics of such social organization include ‘criterial rules’ and 
‘myriad processes of peer review’ (ibid.: 237, 243) that structure interaction and the 
making of judgements in a disciplinary community. Other authors might supplement 
this by foregrounding a requirement for ‘mutual accountability’ and a sense that there 
is something at stake (Rouse, 2007) that continues to bind participants within the social 
dynamic, and a commitment to sincerity and accuracy in dealings between participants 
in the community (Williams, 2002). 
White’s separation of the epistemological from the social frames the remainder 
of White’s argument. He focuses mainly on the first feature (namely his interpretation 
of the epistemology of PK) while offering no substantive discussion of the second 
(the social). This suggests an attempt to drag into epistemology an argument about 
knowledge that has developed within sociology, and specifically the relationship 
between knowledge and society (Durkheim, 2001; Bernstein, 2000). It is also important 
to note that some philosophers have recognized the problems that analytical traditions 
in philosophy have had with studying knowledge, and have turned towards a more 
genealogical or socio-historical approach to accompany, or substitute for, more 
mainstream philosophical inquiry (for example, Bernard Williams (2002), who drew on 
Nietzsche to develop his approach). As Rorty (2002) notes, Williams sought to highlight 
‘the changes in the human self-image that have produced our present institutions, 
intuitions and problems’ as a means of exploring the relationship between the quest for 
truth and the quest for justification. Such approaches enable us to better understand 
how scientific explanation, and ‘ethical and aesthetic judgements’ (Young and Muller, 
2013: 236) have emerged in the social history of knowledge and led us to where we 
are today, recognizing the ‘integral nature of thought and world’ – and that we as 
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humans ‘mediate existence’ (Derry, 2017: 91). Rorty might not have been persuaded by 
Williams, but he recognized the value of the journey, and the genealogical approach 
inspired by Nietzsche. As Young and Muller (2013: 236) observe, since debates 
between Popper and Lakatos in the 1970s, ‘epistemic “bestness” distinguishes truth 
from non-truth in a revisable, non-absolute manner’, and therefore a central focus in 
the study of knowledge becomes how our current understandings of this ‘bestness’ 
have been shaped through socio-historical patterns of inquiry (Collins, 2000). As a 
consequence, the idea that questions of knowledge are purely the province of (pure, 
analytic) epistemology is highly questionable. 
White (2018: 326) draws attention to the different structure of school subjects, 
critiquing the perceived emphasis in PK on the ‘sui generis systems of interrelated 
concepts’. He contrasts the physical sciences and mathematics, which he says have 
‘tightly interconnected conceptual schemes’, with ‘history, geography, English and a 
foreign language’, making a persuasive argument that these latter examples are not 
in fact built around their own ‘system of interrelated concepts’ (ibid.). White focuses 
on examples from the school curriculum in England, a field in which he has particular 
expertise. However, it is questionable whether PK should necessarily be seen as primarily 
identifiable by a sui generis system or by a system of interrelated concepts, and it is (for 
this author) rather important to separate the two aspects of White’s characterization 
here. The term sui generis can be roughly understood as ‘in a class of its own’ or 
‘unique’, and here it is debatable that this is in fact what Young (2015) is suggesting when 
he states that PK is systematic, specialized and subject to relatively fixed boundaries. 
Instead, a more nuanced interpretation could be advanced, suggesting that concepts 
in any given discipline or subject (for example, geography) could potentially have 
some origin in another discipline or subject (for example, sociology or economics) 
but that these concepts have been delocated from their original disciplinary context 
and relocated (Bernstein, 2000) in the new disciplinary context while undergoing 
some transformation to fit the conceptual schema of the receiving discipline and its 
‘supervening purpose’ (Muller, 2009: 213). In the process of ‘selection, appropriation 
and transformation’ the concepts may lose some of their power or some reference to 
the debates through which they emerged (Hordern, 2014). Arguably, it is the job of 
the receiving discipline to capture some essence of those original debates within the 
new disciplinary context and the curriculum that results from it. There is always a risk 
that certain concepts (for example, from sociology or economics) acquire particular 
prominence if recontextualized into another subject (for example, geography) while 
other related concepts, or alternative disciplinary perspectives, do not. 
However, White’s spotlight on ‘systems of interrelated concepts’ as a feature of PK 
raises important questions about what is meant by PK in different subjects. In attempts 
to convey the essence of the argument about PK there is a risk of oversimplifying the 
varied and diverse elements that might make up a school subject. Instead of focusing 
only on interrelated concepts (which as White argues may not be the most prominent 
and defining features of any given subject), PK needs a broader understanding that 
deals with the various (interrelated) elements that make up knowledge and expertise. 
Winch (2010) offers a way into this, by discussing not only propositional knowledge, but 
also the capacity to infer between propositions, the capacity to recognize and apply 
procedures to evaluate new knowledge claims, and various aspects of knowledge 
by acquaintance. Highly significantly for this debate, Winch also draws attention to 
normative versions of practice as a basis for establishing and iterating expertise. If we 
follow Winch, we might argue that a subject such as history is defined as much by its 
procedures and the capacity that historians have to make inferences from propositions 
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(that is, building their ‘specifically historical knowledge’, as White (2018: 327) suggests), 
rather than a web of interrelated abstract concepts per se. Developing historical 
consciousness or a sense of historical significance (Seixas, 2017) may be particularly 
important in becoming a historian, just as developing a sociological imagination (Wright 
Mills, 1959) is central for the sociologist. However, gaining high levels of expertise is 
likely to require sustained engagement in the practice of the discipline. In his article 
on vertical and horizontal discourses, Bernstein (2000) suggests a related argument – 
we need to focus on discourses and not just knowledge structures to get a handle on 
what PK means, and therefore take account of the distinct yet related specialized social 
practices from which the knowledge structures are inextricable (Muller, 2014). 
White also focuses on the errors of what he perceives to be a ‘gulf between 
subject-based and everyday knowledge’ (White, 2018: 327) in Young’s work. However, 
it is again debatable whether Young (and his collaborators) emphasize this gulf. What 
they argue for is a differentiation between the specialized and the everyday based on 
the needs and aspirations of human societies (Young and Muller, 2013), but the use of 
the word gulf implies a separation and hard boundary which does not quite resonate 
with Young and Muller’s (2010: 16) focus on ‘boundary maintenance’ as a means to 
‘boundary crossing’ in PK. Gamble (2014) illustrates, through a discussion of craft 
and mathematics pedagogy that draws on Vygotsky and Bernstein, the processes by 
which objects and interactions can become sacred (or specialized) within pedagogical 
contexts. Through a course of induction, students learn to ‘cross the boundary’ into a 
context governed by the ‘symbolic’, while ‘everyday objects are introduced into the 
classroom’ and thus ‘stripped of their context-specificity to acquire symbolic meaning’ 
(Gamble, 2014: 66). A student already inducted into the specialized practice (of maths 
or furniture-making) will more easily see the object for its significance to the specialized 
practice (while still also being able to see it for its everyday meaning), while a novice 
will be unable to do this. 
This example brings out how proximate our notions of the specialized and 
everyday may be and offers the possibility for a reinterpretation of some of White’s 
illustrations of the relationship between them. For example, White (2018: 326) suggests 
that everyday knowledge ‘depends on networks or interrelated concepts (think perhaps 
of “chair” and “furniture”), but children learn how to use these outside school’. While 
he may be right that children learn what a chair is at home, and may well learn the 
relationship between ‘chair’ and its membership of the category ‘furniture’, this does 
not mean that there is not a more specialized (or powerful) understanding of what a 
chair is, and indeed of types of furniture. As Gamble’s (2014) work illustrates, there is 
an organized and systematic way of understanding the design and construction of 
furniture based on ‘visualizing’ the relationship between parts and whole, and this body 
of knowledge is inextricable from the skilled practitioners who are intimately involved 
in its practice. The existence of an everyday understanding (of an object, context or 
phenomenon) does not preclude the existence of a specialized understanding (of the 
same object, context or phenomenon). And the distinctions between the two are not 
static; they are in a constant train of iteration, pulled in different directions by the 
requirements of our contemporary societies (Durkheim, 2001; Bernstein, 2000; Young 
and Muller, 2013). 
Indeed, the acquisition of PK (or engagement within a disciplinary community 
committed to husbanding and iterating PK) may be more about seeing the world 
differently or acquiring a specialized lens through participation in a socio-epistemic 
community, than about specifically learning a bedrock of interrelated concepts, 
although that may be particularly important in some subjects. Arguably this also raises 
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questions about the ways in which we acquire understanding and participate with 
others in order to learn knowledge in different subjects (Sfard, 1998). In some subjects 
it is participation in certain activities that may be particularly important for attaining 
proficiency (for example, dance, which Young raises in contrast to maths, as White 
notes (2018: 326)), while in others the full participation (for example, in a philosophical 
or sociological debate, or when solving maths problems) may be predicated on a 
command of certain concepts and the capacity to infer between propositions. Induction 
into specialized knowledge does not necessarily need to start in an institution, 
however, as White (2018) illustrates in his comment on Reiss’s experience of learning 
maths. Specialized knowledge is also out there in the world, embedded in some of 
our practices and everyday activities, often without our acknowledgement (Hordern, 
2018). Nevertheless, there may be a limit to which PK can be attained without forms of 
pedagogical participation. 
White’s argument is rooted firmly in debates about the school curriculum in 
England, and this is understandable given his interest and expertise in this area and 
the impact that PK has started to have on specific curriculum debates. However, the 
frame within which he locates his argument conjures a particular version of the PK 
argument that loses some of the wider hinterland from which the notion has emerged, 
as has been outlined above. There are further problems with locating debates about 
PK only in the school curriculum world, as arguably an understanding of PK requires a 
focus on knowledge production in disciplines, as much as the ordering of knowledge 
in the curriculum (Muller, 2009; Young and Muller, 2010, 2013). Bernstein’s (2000) 
work, to which PK is indebted, is helpful here, in distinguishing between the field of 
knowledge production and the field of knowledge recontextualization (in which the 
curriculum emerges). What Bernstein separated analytically in the pedagogic device 
were the dynamics through which knowledge becomes organized into a disciplinary 
form, on the one hand, and the dynamics within which knowledge became organized 
into the curriculum, on the other hand. As Bernstein was largely focused on arguments 
about the school curriculum and its pedagogization, with the exception of some 
elements of his last book, there was much discussion in his work of the dynamics of 
curriculum formation. However, the PK work that Young and his collaborators have 
engaged in has not only intervened in debates about the curriculum (that is, in 
Bernstein’s recontextualization field), but has also focused on knowledge production 
in education and beyond (that is, in Bernstein’s production field), including in work on 
the constitution of professional knowledge and on knowledge in higher education 
(Young and Muller, 2014; Muller, 2009). This has been necessary as part of the broader 
project of which PK is a part, because (as White notes but does not discuss in depth) PK 
is rooted in an understanding of the importance of ‘distinct specialised groups’ (White, 
2018: 326), and such groups usually necessitate considerable involvement from higher 
education, including when they are mainly concerned with the school curriculum (for 
example, geographical or historical subject associations). 
And yet the argument that PK makes for the relationship between higher 
education and the school curriculum is not to be found in White’s critique. The sense 
that knowledge is ever-changing, iterating and provisional runs through Young’s work 
on the sociology of knowledge. For Young and Muller (2013: 236), truth is always 
considered to be ‘revisable’ and ‘non absolute’ as a consequence of disciplinary 
dynamics, and arguably this is just as important as (or more important than) the elements 
that White chooses to discuss. While White again may have a point in suggesting that 
Young is reluctant to engage with ‘ought’ questions, in order to justify knowledge 
as a basis for the curriculum as opposed to aims, this reluctance can be understood 
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through recourse to the sociological approach to the constitution of knowledge and its 
inbuilt fallibilism. Young appears to accept that without a better option (and remaining 
cognizant of the risks of starting with aims), it is better to fall back on the changing 
nature of the shape of knowledge production in higher education as a guide to what 
should be in the curriculum, within the context of the ‘relative stability of subjects and 
their boundaries’ (Young, 2012 in White, 2018: 329). Nonetheless, it is possible that a 
compromise could emerge on these positions. The ‘ethical investigation’ that White 
(2018: 329) calls for could usefully examine the ethics and practices of disciplinarity and 
mutual accountability that arguably underpin the PK thesis, which in their ideal form 
might not be too different from enabling ‘students to lead flourishing lives themselves’ 
and helping ‘others to do so’.
Better understanding PK as exercise and intervention 
While White’s arguments have raised a series of salient points, it is argued here that 
to better understand PK we need to secure a better grasp of the sociology of PK, 
and therefore in particular the different dynamics of the communities into which 
the notion has been introduced. It is possible to share some of White’s reservations 
about PK’s ‘strong, positive, emotional charge’, while finding much of the hinterland 
to the notion, persuasive and highly significant in terms of how we understand the 
relationship between knowledge and society. More than anything, it is important to 
note that a notion such as PK may be taken beyond the bounds of academia and used 
by various organizations and actors to intervene in the worlds of policy and practice 
for reasons that have little to do with the original notion. This is an issue that has 
particular resonance in a discipline (or field) such as education, with its orientations 
towards practice and occupational preparation, and its inevitably political character 
(Hordern, 2018). 
To better understand PK, I suggest we need to draw a semi-permeable 
boundary between the arguments of Young and his collaborators about the sociology 
of educational knowledge, which I contend is a primarily academic exercise, and the 
arguments of Young and others that are interventions in debates about the curriculum 
in national (and in some cases supranational contexts), and therefore interface to a 
much greater extent with the substance of policy and practice. It is interesting to note 
that Guile et al. (2017) in the recent Festschrift for Young, chose to distinguish between 
Young’s contributions to sociology (the first part) and the curriculum (second part), 
while leaving the third part to professional and vocational education. Young and Muller 
(2013: 229) themselves make a distinction between PK as a ‘sociological concept’ and 
as ‘a curriculum principle’. The most important thing for the present discussion is that 
the communities within which the exercise and the intervention are undertaken are 
fundamentally different. While the exercise has played out in academic communities 
constituted to withstand the subtleties and nuances of debates about the sociology of 
knowledge in education, the intervention has resulted in opportunities for the notion 
of PK to be simplified, misunderstood and put to use for political purposes, because 
it has played out in policy (and practice) communities that have offered the notion 
prominence but do not operate with an academic dynamic. The policy communities 
do not necessarily take into account the criterial rules to which Young and Muller (2013) 
draw attention. Furthermore, ‘mutual accountability’, if it ever existed, has largely 
disappeared, and sincerity and accuracy (Williams, 2002) are not always priorities when 
political imperatives come into play. 
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The academic exercise discussing the sociology of educational knowledge has 
offered the opportunity for Young to (largely, but perhaps not entirely) reverse his 
position on knowledge and society through a rereading of Bernstein, Durkheim and 
Vygotsky, and to collaborate with some of his erstwhile critics (notably Rob Moore and 
Johan Muller) to strengthen and undergird a conceptual position. This work resulted 
in articles which sketched out and developed an academically robust position (Moore 
and Young, 2001; Young, 2008). PK has therefore emerged from a body of work that 
seeks to develop a sociology of knowledge that ‘stands in contrast to more traditional 
sociologies of knowledge which have tended to associate the sociality of knowledge 
with bias’ (Young and Muller, 2013: 230). This academic work ‘emphasises how the 
sociality of knowledge underpins its emergent “objective” character’ (ibid.: 230) and 
therefore resists relativism or approaches to knowledge which simply focus on the 
power of the knower. The exercise has been bolstered by symposia organized by 
Young, Muller, Rob Moore and others at the University of Cambridge, which have had 
the aim of exploring ‘access for all to cognitively powerful forms of knowledge as a 
principle of social justice’ and have involved academics ‘informed by the family of 
traditions, such as social realism and Bernsteinian studies, which have established this 
as a primary focus’ (CSKE, 2016). 
However, the intervention in curriculum debates has enabled new interpretations 
and manifestations of PK to emerge that may not reflect all the intentions of its 
originators. Equated with socially refined forms of knowledge (DfE, 2011) in the National 
Curriculum Review, the PK notion has surfaced in the policy domain, and thus has 
become part of the debates about curriculum practice that involve school leaders and 
teachers in England. The realities of curriculum reform processes in England, and in 
particular the centralized and government-controlled form of curriculum policymaking, 
mean that decisions have to be made by policymakers and school leaders about the 
actual knowledge authorized as powerful. In DfE (2011: 6) for example, PK becomes 
conflated with essential knowledge that is expressed in terms of facts, concepts, 
principles and fundamental operations in curriculum documentation. Tim Oates, the 
Chair of the Expert Panel of the 2011 National Curriculum Review, in his chapter in 
Young’s Festschrift, goes as far as to suggest that Young and Muller’s (2010) Future 3 
Curriculum (equating to PK) is not too dissimilar to a Future 1 Curriculum (which Young 
and Muller (2010: 17) describe as ‘overt’ and ‘strictly stipulated’ and ‘a recipe for social 
divisiveness, inequality, unhappiness, and conﬂict’).1 According to Oates (2017: 159), 
there is no substantive division because both have a preference for subjects first and 
foremost and just require ‘a short and intensive debate to resolve the practicalities of 
translation into legitimate curriculum policy’. However, Young and Muller’s Future 2 
(which values ‘progressive pedagogy’ and the ‘end of boundaries’ (2010: 19) with the 
aim of achieving learner autonomy and equality of access) ‘in epistemological terms is 
in a galaxy far, far away’ (Oates, 2017). Guile et al. (2017), in their summary of Oates’s 
chapter in the Festschrift, interpret this as an argument for seeing Future 2 as the real 
villain of the curriculum world. 
For others, too, it is a subject-based curriculum which is the real goal, not the 
nuances and potential uncertainties of PK. Alex Standish’s (a contributor to the Institute 
of Ideas (IoI, 2012)) response to the National Curriculum Review, asserts that ‘following 
the decline of traditional conservative justifications for a subject-based education over 
recent decades, current policymakers lack any strong rationale for why subject should 
be taught in schools’ (ibid.: 8). But Oates’s position (and perhaps that of Standish) 
neglects the fact that Future 3 PK wouldn’t exist without the debates that underpinned 
the development of Future 2 (and the concerns of those that advocate Future 2 as a 
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response to Future 1). It is interesting to read further in the Institute of Ideas education 
forum report and see contributors describing PK as ‘vague’ and showing evidence 
of ‘posturing’ (ibid.: 11 and 16). For some, PK may be useful for garnering academic 
credibility for their real objectives, to be dismissed when no longer deemed necessary. 
Is there a risk of a (partial) hijacking of PK by groups with particular motives who 
have little time or interest in the nuances of academic debates? It is possible that 
it could be seen in that way. In the English context, where there are assertions that 
school leaders and teachers have an ‘appetite’ for evidence ‘presented crisply and 
cleanly, stripped of academic jargon, to inform their decision-making’ (EEF, 2018: 2), 
a reductive interpretation of PK could be used as part of an advocacy for a top-down 
curriculum focused on ‘core subjects’ that can support school effectiveness and 
improvement agendas, narrowly conceived. If leaders and teachers are being pushed 
into taking decisions by a schooling system that treats schools as functional agents of 
policy implementation and teachers as instrumental technicians, then there may be 
little choice or debate about knowledge (Hordern and Tatto, 2018). The appetite for 
knowledge may be there, but the social organization of knowledge in the policy and 
practice domains can lead to a force-feeding of a particular (potentially poisonous) 
sustenance. Such an interpretation suggests that the ‘knowledge-led professionalism’ 
with ‘teachers as “curriculum leaders”’ that Lambert (2017: 141) advocates will remain 
difficult to orchestrate in many contexts. There may be little to gain for children in a 
subject-based curriculum if the resultant pedagogy does not take their circumstances 
and starting points fully into account (Whitty, 2010), and if teachers are not in a position 
to make this (pedagogically) possible as a consequence of overstipulation, or pressure 
from school leaders to meet certain narrow objectives. 
PK has thus taken root not solely as an academic notion (as is perhaps best 
illustrated in Young and Muller, 2013), but as an idea that has influenced policy thinking 
and curriculum reform and has proved appealing to overtly political organizations 
(such as the Institute of Ideas, 2012). The relatively cordial and forgiving atmosphere 
of academia is rather different from the policy world: the specialized disciplinary 
community is absent and no longer able to uphold the ‘mutual accountability’, ‘sincerity’ 
or ‘accuracy’ which we would hope for (if not always obtain) in academic circles. This is 
of course a pattern not unique to PK, but could occur with any academic notion that 
has resonance beyond academia and becomes a popular idea. It could nevertheless 
be argued that PK has helped reinvigorate debate about the curriculum that will always 
cross boundaries between schools, education academics and policymakers. The 
longer-term consequences may be beneficial for curriculum-thinking and curriculum-
making, even if the PK curriculum (as interpreted by some) is not the end point. 
However, the relative prominence of the intervention in curriculum debates as 
opposed to the academic exercise of adumbrating the hinterland of PK has other 
consequences, which have become apparent in some of the writings of both academics 
and other interested parties about PK; these are reflected somewhat in White’s (2018) 
critique. In particular, there may be tendencies to overlook the relationship between 
knowledge production and the school curriculum (and the need for an understanding 
of a recontextualization process between discipline and subject); to focus specifically 
on concepts and knowledge structures, as opposed to thinking more broadly about the 
varied dimensions of knowledge; and to understand PK simplistically as ammunition 
to reinforce a particular version of the subject curriculum. Furthermore, and this is 
not specifically elaborated in White’s critique, there is also a risk that PK becomes 
conflated with particular forms of pedagogy (Whitty, 2010), and to justify what some 
would consider a traditional, almost authoritarian, approach to schooling. 
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White’s arguments can therefore be seen as part of a necessary response and 
challenge to the PK intervention in curriculum debates. A number of the questions 
raised are pertinent and substantive, but can perhaps be better understood if 
we grasp the origins of the PK ideas and the arguments from which they emerge. 
White’s (2018: 333–4) criticism that debates about PK lack ‘careful exposition and 
close argumentation’ holds true only for the intervention in curriculum discussions. 
He would be right that these discussions do not meet standards of ‘sincerity’ and 
‘accuracy’, to use Williams’s (2002) terms. His charge does not, however, hold so well 
for the academic exercise that preceded and continues to run alongside the curriculum 
intervention and manifestations of PK (for example, Young and Muller, 2013). Those 
academic debates can be understood as part and parcel of discourse in the sociology 
of knowledge, drawing where necessary on philosophical and historical sources, just 
as philosophy itself has admitted that it may need to reach beyond its boundaries and 
draw on sociology and history to tackle questions of knowledge in the round (Williams, 
2002; Rorty, 2002). 
Concluding remarks
This article has asserted that PK cannot be fully grasped without an understanding of 
its sociological hinterland. PK emerges from a tradition which understands knowledge 
as socio-historically constituted, in which the social and the epistemic are inextricable, 
and where certain kinds of social relations are necessary for sacred (or powerful) 
knowledge to arise and for its power to be sustained. Bernstein’s (2000) work elaborates 
the Durkheimian distinction between the sacred and the profane and demonstrates 
its analytical potential, while Young and Muller (2013) and others articulate Durkheim 
and Bernstein’s work with further philosophical, sociological and educational thought, 
and explore implications for the curriculum; and this has led to PK. But there are 
considerable risks of misinterpretation if this subtle socio-epistemic hinterland of PK is 
not understood or if it is wilfully ignored. The ‘positive emotional charge’ (White, 2018: 
325) of PK makes it potentially useful political ammunition – and therefore it may be 
used in a variety of ways for rather different purposes, including to justify conservative 
or culturally elite curriculum prescriptions. 
Foregrounding the academic exercise that led to PK also suggests that it may 
be important to continue this academic work to further develop PK or related ideas 
such as specialized knowledge (a term that has less of the emotional resonance of 
PK). Here, I briefly suggest two related ways in which this could be done to enhance 
understandings about PK in disciplines and the curriculum.
The first is to pick up the earlier point about normative practice as an 
underpinning for the specialized disciplinary communities and the socio-epistemic 
dynamic which produces specialized or powerful knowledge. Rouse (2007) writes that 
normative definitions of practice rest on notions of ‘mutual accountability’ between 
practitioners and a sense that there is something ‘at stake’. Winch (2010), in a similar 
vein, identifies the necessity for normative evaluation in any expert practice, and for 
the constitution of norms to be a social process in which practitioners’ participation 
and understanding is key. Arguably, there is some articulation here with Durkheimian 
notions of social organization (Hordern, 2018), just as there are with understandings of 
disciplinarity in the philosophy of education (Bridges, 2006). Young and Muller’s (2013) 
work touches on this, and there could be further exploration of how norms might be 
constituted, which might be different in different disciplines and subject communities 
depending on their orientations (that is, to particular forms of practice, occupation or 
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subject matter). And the practice idiom has more to offer, in particular to explicate (for 
example, drawing on Vygotskian work) the ways in which novice practitioners become 
experts through particular forms of participation with others.
The second is to step back and reflect more on the relationship between aims 
and knowledge as a basis for the curriculum, and to ask if these approaches are really 
mutually exclusive, as the debates between Young and White could lead us to believe. 
One reading of Young’s work might suggest that the aims that guide the ongoing 
iteration of disciplines and disciplinary communities could be useful for thinking about 
the curriculum, particularly when arguments return to Bernstein’s idea that knowledge 
enables citizens to engage in ‘society’s conversation about itself’ (Young and Muller, 
2013: 245). A source for a discussion about aims could be Bernstein’s (2000) pedagogic 
rights, which foreground participation, inclusion and enhancement, particularly if these 
are seen as having mutually reinforcing capacities. However, in order to gather and 
gain support for a set of aims which adequately represent the relationship between 
knowledge and society, disciplines and curricula, there needs to be a fuller recognition 
of the extent to which all voices (with particular support to the new voices) need to 
be included and enabled to participate in our contemporary societies. On the one 
hand, a PK that does not explicate and reflexively re-examine its aims risks retreating 
into conservatism and stasis, and becoming seen as representative of particular social 
groups. On the other hand, a PK that sees itself as constantly iterating to engage with 
the character and needs of all in society will need to debate the aims that lie behind 
and within it, and to do this it will need the kinds of academic exercises that Young and 
his collaborators have engaged in, not just interventions in the curriculum. 
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Note
1 Young and Muller (2010: 20) introduced ‘three educational scenarios for the future’: Future 1, 
which prioritizes ‘transmitting elite cultural knowledge to the select few’ (ibid.: 16–17); Future 2, 
which weakens knowledge boundaries and integrates subjects; and Future 3, which recognizes that 
specialized or powerful knowledge is produced in certain social conditions and leads to ‘preferred 
curriculum and pedagogic models’ (ibid.: 20). 
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